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CYBERSECURITY AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE:
FRAMING THE ISSUES FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
David G. Delaney'
Abstract
In the digital age, every part of federal government has critical cybersecurity
interests. Many of those issues are brought into sharp focus by Edward Snowden's
disclosure of sensitive government cyber intelligence programs conducted by the
National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Courts are reviewing various constitutional and statutory
challenges to those programs, two government review groups have reported on
related legal and policy issues, and Congress is considering cyber intelligence
reform proposals. All of this action comes on the heels of significant efforts by
successive administrations to restructure government and pass comprehensive
cybersecurity legislation to improve the nation's posture to strategically address
cyber issues. This Article proposes that new framework legislation is needed to




Cybersecurity can be understood as efforts to secure digital information, the
equipment that processes that information, and the means of transmitting that
information among devices. At its core, cybersecurity involves information security
or assurance-preserving the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of
information.2  This field is sometimes expanded to include authenticity,
accountability, non-repudiation, reliability and resilience. 3
But the term is also shaped and informed by perspectives on cyberspace-the
zones beyond an entity's own networks that affect security of its information.
1. Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and former Deputy
Associate General Counsel, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Toby Sedgwick and Antonina Semivolos
deserve special thanks for their invaluable research assistance.
2. Lukas Feiler, Information Security Law in the EU and the U.S: A Risk-Based Assessment of
Regulatory Policies, 8 (2011), available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/information-security-
law-in-the-eu-and-the-us-%E2%80%94-a-risk-based-assessment-of-regulatory-policies.




Government entities delivering public services4 and private entities conducting
business via the Internet, mobile devices, and electronic connections take strategic
approaches to managing cyber risk. These strategies increasingly include proactive,
operational steps to secure or defend computer networks. The Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) established a "continuous diagnostics and mitigation"
program in conjunction with the General Services Administration (GSA) to enable
federal, state, local, and regional governments "to provide a consistent,
government-wide set of continuous diagnostic solutions to enhance defenders'
abilities to identify and mitigate emerging cyber threats through risk-based decision
making."5 The U.S. Cyber Command defends networks in military, not merely
administrative, terms. And private companies increasingly pursue "active defense"
strategies to identify and prevent specific cyber threat actors.7 These approaches
reflect a common interest in pursuing all available legal and technological means to
identify, prevent, and disrupt cybersecurity concerns as early and efficiently as
possible, preferably well before the threats reach an entity's networks.
These concepts of cybersecurity and cyberspace are joined as much in broad
national strategies as in practice for public and private entities. The Department of
Defense (DOD) identified cyberspace as a new domain of warfare in 2011.8 DHS
asserts that "[o]ur daily life, economic vitality, and national security depend on a
4. See, e.g., FISMA, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 etseq.; MEMORANDUM M-14-03 FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES (2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2014/m-
14-03.pdf; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, SP 800-37 REVISION 1, "GUIDE FOR
APPLYING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK TO FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS A SECURITY LIFE
CYCLE APPROACH" (2010), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-37-revl/sp800-37-rev1-
final.pdf; NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY, SP 800-39, "MANAGING INFORMATION
SECURITY RISK: ORGANIZATION, MISSION, AND INFORMATION SYSTEM VIEW" (2011), available at
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-39/SP800-39-final.pdf
5. U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION,
http://www.us-cert.gov/cdm (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). See also, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION, http://www.dhs.gov/cdm (last visited Apr. 21,
2014); U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, CONTINUOUS DIAGNOSTICS AND MITIGATION,
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/176671?utm-source=FAS&utm-medium=print-
radio&utmterm=cdm&utmscampaign=shortcuts (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
6. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE, 5-7 (2011), available
at http://www.defense.gov/news/d2010714cyber.pdf [hereinafter DOD CYBER STRATEGY]; U.S. CYBER
COMMAND, FACTSHEET, http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/2/Cyber_-Command ("The Command has three
main focus areas: Defending the DoDIN [Department of Defense information networks], providing support to
combatant commanders for execution of their missions around the world, and strengthening our nation's
ability to withstand and respond to cyber attack.") (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
7. See, e.g., Tom Bowers, Time For An 'Active Defense' Against Security Attacks, INFORMATION
WEEK DARK READING, Dec. 12, 2013, http://www.darkreading.com/security-monitoring/time-for-an-active-
defense-against-security-attacks/d/d-id/l 113011; Press Release, CrowdStrike Launches Big Data Active
Defense Platform, June 18, 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/crowdstrike-launches-big-data-
active-defense-platform-211954701.html; CrowdStrike Blog Post, Active Defense: Time for a New Security
Strategy, Feb. 25, 2013, http://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/active-defense-time-new-security-strategy/.
8. See DOD CYBER STRATEGY, supra note 6, at 5. See also U.S. DEP'T. OF DEF., THE CYBER DOMAIN:
SECURITY AND OPERATIONS, http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2013/0713_cyberdomain/ (last visited
Apr. 21, 2014) (providing links to information about the cyber forces of the military services, DOD cyber
research, cyber education for the service academies, cyber speeches of senior DOD and intelligence officials,
and other DOD and federal cyber entities).
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stable, safe, and resilient cyberspace."9 Law enforcement efforts to investigate
crime and reduce threats in cyberspace are categorized as cybersecurity risk
management objectives, not merely cybercrime, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence functions.to And since 9/11 each President has issued national
cyber policies and directives that identify international, economic, and regulatory
objectives for cyberspace and cybersecurity. 1 In these documents the private sector
is identified as a primary developer of new technology, partner in developing the
U.S. and global economies, and source of expertise on emerging norms for the
development and regulation of cyberspace. Cybersecurity thus comprises many
interdependent, public-private, domestic-foreign, and military-civilian national
interests.
B. The Snowden Disclosures
Cyber intelligence programs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
National Security Agency (NSA), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) are at the
center of public disclosures by Edward Snowden, a former NSA contractor. In this
Article, the term "cyber intelligence programs" refers to the programs and
investigations of these agencies and other elements of the U.S. intelligence
community that are conducted pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (FISA),1 Executive Order 12,333, or other sources of law regulating
intelligence actions.14 This term includes widely reported programs like the NSA's
bulk telephony metadata or "business records" program conducted pursuant to
9. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, CYBERSECURITY OVERVIEW,
http://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-overview (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (providing information about "the
cyber ecosystem," responding to cyber vulnerabilities, cybersecurity, cyber crime, privacy, and cybersecurity
partnerships).
10. See WHITE HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY FOR CYBERSPACE 9 (2011) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss viewer/internationalstrategyjforcyberspace.pdf; WHITE
HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 21: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AND RESILIENCE
(2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-
critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil.
I1. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003); WHITE HOUSE,
THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/cybersecurity/national-initiative ("The activities under way
to implement the recommendations of the Cyberspace Policy Review build on the Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) launched by President George W. Bush in National Security Presidential
Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) in January 2008. President
Obama determined that the CNCI and its associated activities should evolve to become key elements of a
broader, updated national U.S. cybersecurity strategy. These CNCI initiatives will play a key role in
supporting the achievement of many of the key recommendations of President Obama's Cyberspace Policy
Review.") Exec. Order No. 13,636 § 1, 78 Fed. Reg. 11737 (Feb. 19, 2013); WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL
SECURITY STRATEGY (2012), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/national-security-strategy.pdf.
12. Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq.)
[hereinafter FISA].
13. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59941 .
14. See, e.g., National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, 61 Stat. 495 [hereinafter National
Security Act]; 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2006); 50 U.S.C § 3162 (2006) (authorizing
administrative subpoenas or "National Security Letters" for intelligence purposes).
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section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act,' 5 the NSA's PRISM program conducted
pursuant to FISA section 702,16 the CIA's financial information program pursuant
to section 215,17 and the FBI's roles in these programs. It also includes programs
that remain outside the public view or, like the NSA's now-defunct bulk pen
register/trap and trace collection program authorized by FISA,'9 on the fringes of
the public dialog.
Snowden's disclosures have not touched upon the additional, non-intelligence
cyber activities that these and other government agencies conduct under a variety of
other legal authorities. For example, the FBI investigates cybercrime and conducts
significant cybersecurity outreach to the private sector in all fifty-six U.S. field
offices as a function of its combined law enforcement, infrastructure protection, and
intelligence functions.20 Through a combination of federal law and presidential
directives, the NSA provides information security expertise to the defense
community21 and administers the government-wide information security program
for "national security systems,"22 which handle information classified according to
15. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD; REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS. OF THE PRESIDENT'S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES, 79-89, 94-98, (2013), available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-
12_rgfinal-report.pdf [hereinafter LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD] (discussing the history
of section 215 and its use to obtain business records of individuals); Order, "In Re Application of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [TEXT
REDACTED]," Docket No. BR (FISA Ct. April 25, 2013) [hereinafter FISC Order of April 2013], available
at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/PrimaryOrderCollection 215.pdf.
16. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2008).
17. Charlie Savage & Mark Mazzetti, CIA. Collects Global Data on Transfers of Money, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/15/us/cia-collecting-data-on-intemational-money-transfers-
officials-say.html; Siobhan Gorman, Devlin Barrett & Jennifer Valentino-Devries, C.I.A.'s Financial Spying
Bags Data on Americans: Information on International Money Transfers Includes Financial and Personal
Data ofAmericans, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl 0001424052702303559504579198370113163530.
18. FISC Order of April 2013, supra note 15; Shane Harris, Meet the Spies Doing the NSA 's Dirty Work,
FOREIGN POLICY, Nov. 21, 2013,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/21/theobscurefbiteamthatdoesthe-nsa.dirty-work.
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1841-1846 (1978); See also, LETTER FROM RONALD WElCH, ASSISTANT ATT'Y GEN. TO
THE HONORABLE SILVESTRE REYES, CHAIRMAN, PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2009_CoverLetterReport-Collection.pdf ("We agree that it is important
that all Members of Congress have access to information about [the Section 215 "business records" program],
as well as a similar bulk collection program conducted under the pen register/trap and trace authority of FISA,
when considering reauthorization of the expiring USA PATRIOT Act provisions."); LIBERTY AND SECURITY
IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 15 at 97, n.91 (discussing two NSA programs ended in 2009 and 2011);
Reports of the Attorney General on the Use of Pen Registers and/or Trap and Trace Devices Under the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, (2001-2013), available at
www.dni.gov/files/documents/0304/PRTT%20semi%20annual%20one-page%2Oreports.pdf (not identifying
whether the NSA or other government entity uses the authority).
20. 28 U.S.C. § 533 (2002); 28 CFR § 0.85; FBI CYBER TASK FORCE, INFORMATION SHEET, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/cyber-task-forces-building-alliances-to-improve-the-nations-
cybersecurity-1.
21. 10 U.S.C. § 2224 (2004)
22. NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 42, NATIONAL POLICY FOR THE SECURITY OF NATIONAL SECURITY
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1990), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsd/nsd42 [hereafter NSD-42].
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law and presidential directive for national security purposes.23 Both agencies
provide technical assistance to help private sector entities respond to cyber
incidents as an extension of their various authorities.24 The military, too, conducts a
range of cyber functions pursuant to defense, law enforcement, and administrative
authorities. None of these cyber activities are included in the term "cyber
intelligence programs." They are, however, included in this Article's more general
references to cyber functions, activities, or duties of government entities.
As may be expected from any significant disclosure of state secrets, Snowden's
actions create deleterious effects in many areas. A January 2014 Pew Research
Center poll reveals that forty percent of respondents approve of the NSA's
programs and fifty-three percent disapprove,25 whereas a mid-2013 survey showed
a majority of respondents approving of the NSA programs.26 U.S. technology and
cloud computing companies are estimated to lose between $35 and $180 billion of
overseas business annually in the coming years.27 In 2013, Cisco reported an
unprecedented decline in Chinese equipment orders, which was thought to relate to
Snowden's disclosures.28 And Cisco partly attributed an additional ten percent
decline in early 2014 emerging market orders to those disclosures as well.29 Large
global companies like EMC and Facebook publicly express distrust of government
entities as partners in information security and technology development. 30 AOL,
Apple, Dropbox, Facebook, Google, Linkedin, Microsoft, Twitter and Yahoo have
23. FISMA, 42 U.S.C. § 3542(b)(2) (1983).
24. Interview with National Security Agency senior officials at Ft. Meade, Md. (Feb. 27, 2014) (stating
that the NSA lacks authority to provide incident response assistance directly to private sector entities but may
provide such assistance through the FBI, DHS, or other agencies that ask for their assistance) [hereinafter
NSA Interview].
25. PEW RESEARCH CTR., OBAMA'S NSA SPEECH HAS LITTLE IMPACT ON SKEPTICAL PUBLIC 3 (2014),
available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/l-20-14%20NSA%2ORelease.pdf
26. PEW RESEARCH CTR., FEW SEE ADEQUATE LIMITS ON NSA SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM: BUT MORE
APPROVE THAN DISAPPROVE 1-2 (2013), available at http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdfl7-26-
2013%20NSA%20release.pdf.
27. DANIEL CASTRO, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., How MUCH WILL PRISM COST THE
U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY? 3 (2013) available at http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-
costs.pdf (concluding that U.S. cloud computing providers may lose between $21.5 billion and $35.0 billion
over the next three years);
James Staten, The Cost of PRISM Will Be Larger Than ITIF Projects, FORRESTER BLOGS, Aug. 14, 2013,
http://blogs.forrester.com/james staten/13-08-14-the-cost-of prism..wll-be_1arger.thanitifiprojects
(arguing that the cost to overall IT service provider revenues could be as high as $180 billion).
28. Don Clark, Cisco CEO: 'Never Seen' Such a Falloff in Orders, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2013, at Bl,
available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBl0001424052702304243904579196241425599938 (Cisco
chief executive John Chambers ". .. acknowledged that recent disclosures about surveillance activities by the
U.S. National Security Agency may be adding to the woes facing Cisco and other U.S. companies in China,
though the effect seems to be 'fairly nominal' in other countries.").
29. Nicola Leske & Edwin Chan, UPDATE 5-Cisco Warns of Revenue Slide as Hardware Spending
Sputters, REUTERS, Feb. 12, 2014, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/13/cisco-results-
idUSL2NOLH2OS20140213 ("That gloomy outlook, though about in line with Wall Street expectations,
marks another severe decline in sales for the former high-flying tech company, which has partly blamed its
poor run on a boycott of U.S. equipment after revelations of American spying efforts globally.").
30. E.g. ART COVIELLO, KEYNOTE ADDRESS AT THE RSA CONFERENCE (2014), available at
http://www.emc.com/collateral/corporation/rsa-conference-keynote-art-coviello-feburary-24-2014.pdf;




created a Reform Government Surveillance coalition to advocate changes to
government's cyber intelligence policies and programs.3 1 And the European Union
has announced its intent to minimize the U.S. role in Internet governance at
upcoming conferences in Turkey and Brazil.32 In short, Snowden's disclosures of
cyber intelligence programs create significant, long-lasting challenges for both
public and private entities providing cybersecurity functions and otherwise seeking
to develop and use cyberspace. They also expose tensions in the way government
balances policy interests, applies legal norms, and ultimately develops strategic
approaches to cybersecurity and cyberspace.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to further categorize or quantify beneficial
and detrimental effects of Snowden's actions. Neither does this Article attempt a
counterfactual comparison of benefits and harms that might have existed or accrued
if the information had not been disclosed. Assuming that such efforts were possible,
they are highly likely to be ephemeral as further investigation, reporting,33
government transparency, 34 and court decisions35 continue to sharpen the nation's
focus on points of particular legal and policy interest.
This Article draws upon the additional public awareness-however limited-
that Snowden's disclosures have brought to understanding the complexity of
cybersecurity issues and related social, political, and legal values in discussions of
cyber legislative reform. 36 It proposes that traditional thinking about national
security issues must be recast to match the most important characteristics of the
cyber environment-foreign/domestic, civilian/military, federal/non-federal, public/
private, and regulatory/non-regulatory dualities that exist in law and related
governance structures, policies, and processes. Specifically, this Article proposes a
further evolution of the understanding and conduct of national security functions to
achieve national cyberspace objectives.
31. REFORM GOVERNMENT SURVEILLANCE, https://www.reformgovemmentsurveillance.com/ (last
visited Mar. 14, 2014).
32. PRESS RELEASE, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMMISSION TO PURSUE ROLE AS HONEST BROKER IN
FUTURE GLOBAL NEGOTIATIONS ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE (2014), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
releaseIP-14-142_en.htm.
33. E.g., Edward Snowden, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/edward-snowden (last
visited Apr. 11, 2014); NSA Secrets, THE WASHINGTON POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/nsa-secrets
(last visited Apr. I1, 2014).
34. E.g., IC on the Record, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com (last visited Apr. 11, 2014) ("provides immediate, ongoing and direct access
to factual information related to the lawful foreign surveillance activities carried out by the U.S. Intelligence
community," content can be sorted by topics such as 'FISA,' 'FISC,' 'Section 215,' and 'Section 702').
35. E.g., Klayman v. Obama, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. 2013) (granting preliminary injunction
directed toward Government's bulk collection and querying of phone record data, but staying order pending
appeal) appeal docketed, Nos. 14-5004, 14-5005, 14-5016, 14-5017 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 9, 2014), cert. before
judgment denied, 13-931 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2014);.American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d
724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding Government's bulk telephony metadata program lawful) appeal docketed, No.
14-42 (2d Cir. Jan. 6. 2014); Jewel v. National Sec. Agency 673 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding AT&T
customers have standing to bring claim for mass interception of telephone, internet, and electronic
communications, and reversing and remanding to district court).
36. NSA Interview, supra note 24 (asserting that publicly reported information from Snowden's
disclosures provides only snapshots of relevant issues, equivalent to looking through a small straw).
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II. The Cyber Administrative National Security State
The term "national security" commonly refers to issues of vital national import
in a way that reflexively invokes images of military action abroad, diplomatic
crises, and perhaps covert or otherwise highly secretive intelligence activities-
executive branch actions that aim to preserve or secure sovereign interests. 37 In
government circles, lack of clarity about the meaning of the term can invite both
unintentional misunderstanding and intentional debate related to its various legal
and policy definitions. 38  Both outcomes are unhelpful when considering
cybersecurity issues and responsibilities.
Cyberspace presents a range of dichotomous circumstances for executive and
legislative bodies to comprehend. It is at once local and global, commercial and
public, proprietary and open-source, civilian and military, regulated and
unregulated. As cyberspace evolves, it is increasingly likely that threat actors can
remotely cause kinetic attacks, disrupt vital national systems, or diminish
government response capabilities. To a significant degree, information assurance,
network defense, security, and resilience of energy and other infrastructure systems,
military readiness, disaster response capabilities and countless other national
interests present a common set of cybersecurity concerns.
To reflect these circumstances, in this Article the term "national security" refers
to any concern of vital national import that federal or sub-federal governments are
empowered to address. Cyber national security concerns can exist, for example,
when domestic or foreign individuals or groups steal intellectual property from
private computers located in one or several states, transmit the data to a foreign
government, sell it to a domestic terrorist group, use the information to undermine
the security or stability of U.S. energy systems or other infrastructure, extort the
information owners, sell the data to criminal enterprises, or transmit the data back
into the United States and create 3-D printings of equipment. Many state and
federal regulatory entities have interests in these issues. The activities invite law
enforcement investigations by state and federal agencies under many criminal and
civil laws. Information assurance and network defense functions of private
companies, state governments, and federal governments are all concerned with
preventing some range of these events, identifying and disrupting ongoing actions,
and responding to and recovering from emergencies. Federal and state emergency
management agencies are similarly motivated to prepare for, respond to, and
37. For an expansive and thoughtful treatment of the meaning and implications of the term, see JAMES E.
BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES, 13-22 (2007).
38. Compare Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. 3 § 1(b) (2012) ("'national
security,' as used in this Act, means the national defense and foreign relations of the United States"), with
THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 1: ORGANIZING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SYSTEM (2009), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-1.pdf (directing the National Security
Council to assist the President in "integrating all aspects of national security policy as it affects the United
States - domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic," as well as "international economic issues,"
"homeland security or counter-terrorism related issues," and "science and technology related issues"), and
THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2010), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss-viewer/national-security-strategy.pdf ("We are now
moving beyond traditional distinctions between homeland and national security.").
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recover from natural or man-made disasters prompted by a cyber threat or involving
cyber consequences for the public. The need to consider how federal and state
governments can best understand and address their respective concerns is therefore
compelling. 39
This Article focuses on federal functions that address cyber national security
threats during any emergency or non-emergency periods. The term "cyber
administrative national security state" is used as shorthand for the collective federal
executive and legislative branch entities with responsibility for cyber national
security threats. This phrasing accomplishes two objectives. First, it encourages an
inclusive conception of the myriad elements of federal government that must be
able to operate in concert-however discordantly, fruitfully, or democratically-to
address emergent cyber concerns. Second, the term conveys the highly regulated,
process-driven, inter-branch nature of government's approach to cyber national
security threats by calling to mind the structured regimes and processes of the
administrative state. That is, the term helps conceptualize how legal, political, and
social norms are incorporated into government structures and processes across
military, intelligence, law enforcement, administrative, emergency response, and
other cyber communities regardless whether the nation is actively facing an
emergency related to military, terrorist, natural, or other threats.
The cyber administrative national security state is collectively concerned with
diverse threats posed by individuals, groups, and nation-states. Attacks with kinetic
effects-e.g., armed attacks, weapons of mass destruction, and acts of sabotage-
are vital concerns, and they are no longer the preserve of military or intelligence
arms of national governments. The cyber administrative national security state is
also concerned with energy, banking, finance, health, economic, climate, and many
other fields that can present vital threats. A complete listing of component entities is
beyond the scope of this Article, but the NSA, U.S. Cyber Command, FBI Cyber
Division, many parts of the U.S. intelligence community,40 the DHS Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications, and the Justice Department's National
Security Division are among the more prominent elements of the cyber
administrative national security state. Congress's committees and subcommittees
with jurisdiction over these entities are the legislative branch components of the
cyber administrative national security state.
III. Cybersecurity and the Emergency Paradigm
The cyber administrative national security state is built upon and operated
through a wide range of laws, policies, and processes that govern federal actions
during periods of emergency and normalcy. The law applicable during emergencies
includes explicit and implicit principles of emergency power rooted in the
39. See generally Michael J. Glennon, State-level Cybersecurity, 171 POL'Y REv. 85 (2012) (proposing
how state governments can play important cybersecurity roles where intemational and federal efforts have
been presumed to be primary or exclusive actors).
40. 50 U.S.C. § 3003(4) (2012); OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE,
http://www.intelligence.gov/mission/member-agencies.html (last visited May 7, 2014).
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Constitution, legislation, court opinions, legal theory and other sources. This Article
uses the term "emergency paradigm" to refer to this collective body of law. It
serves as a framework to assess government's posture to address cyber national
security threats in three areas: what elements of government are responsible; how
are government actions regulated; and how is accountability achieved?
The Constitution's explicit foreign affairs and defense provisions serve as the
organic, historical core of the emergency paradigm. Congress's duties include
declaring war, raising and supporting armies, providing and maintaining a navy,
governing the militia, and providing advice and consent on treaties. 41 The
President's duties include making treaties, serving as commander in chief of the
army and navy, and, when called into federal service, commanding the state
militias.42 The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus "when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it" is another element
of the emergency paradigm.43 These explicit constitutional statements are merely
starting points to consider government's appropriate roles, structures, and processes
to address emergency and non-emergency circumstances. The remainder of Part III
describes how courts, legal theory, and framework legislation have influenced the
evolution of constitutional norms and expansion of the emergency paradigm to
include the broader concerns of the cyber administrative national security state.
A. Constitutional Norms
Over the last century, two world wars, the threat of nuclear annihilation, several
protected armed conflicts in Asia, hostage crises on land and sea, peacekeeping and
stability efforts, global economic crises, foreign and domestic terrorist attacks on
U.S. interests, and other geopolitical concerns have reshaped the emergency
paradigm beyond the Constitution's explicit terms. The variety of emergency
threats the nation has faced is reflected in various court decisions and legal theories
about government's emergency powers. This section discusses two particularly
significant influences that have placed domestic and non-military government
functions at the center of the emergency paradigm and the functioning of the cyber
administrative national security state.'
1. Youngstown and Legislative Clarity
Few court cases provide broadly applicable instruction on constitutional
emergency powers. One that has stood the test of time and warranted mention by
courts in a range of emergency circumstances over sixty years is Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer.44 The case presented the opportunity for the Supreme Court
to review President Truman's executive order for the Department of Commerce to
41. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8; Id. art. II, § 2.
42. Id. art. II, § 2.
43. Id. art. I, § 9.
44. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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take possession of and operate privately owned steel mills in order to maintain steel
production in the face of a threatened labor strike.45
Justice Hugo Black summarized a number of key facts in the Court's brief
opinion: military forces were engaged in combat in Korea; Congress had passed
two laws that provided mechanisms to resolve labor disputes; and Congress had
considered and rejected a legislative proposal to allow the kind of emergency
seizure the President directed. 46 The Supreme Court declared the President's
actions unconstitutional; he had exceeded his military duties as commander in
chief47 and acted as a legislator, a function that was reserved for Congress.48 Justice
Black focused on the Constitution's overarching charges. Regarding the President's
roles he wrote:
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that
the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a
lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking
process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of
laws he thinks bad.49
And, with respect to Congress,
the Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall make
laws which the President is to execute. The first section of the first
article says that "All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States * * *." After granting many powers to
the Congress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution
the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof."50
In his concurring opinion, Justice Robert Jackson emphasized that Congress's
duties in such circumstances did not end with declaring war, raising and equipping
military forces, and making rules to regulate the military.51 Congress alone was
responsible for raising and appropriating revenue and addressing labor issues
affecting industry. 52 Congress had drawn upon its several explicit constitutional
duties that operate equally in emergency and non-emergency situations; President
Truman's actions were unconstitutional because they did not respect the full
45. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952).
46. 343 U.S. at 585-86.
47. Id. at 587.
48. Id. at 587-88.
49. Id at 587.
50. Id. at 587-88.
51. Id. at642-44.
52. Id. at 643.
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complement of those duties.
Youngstown gives some further shape to the President's constitutional
obligation to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."53 But the
cybersecurity realm presents perhaps the ultimate tangle of circumstances that
invoke the broad range of legislative duties for the executive to respect during
emergencies. Congress plainly has constitutional responsibility to define and
address cybersecurity needs pursuant to its exclusive legislative function, the
"necessary and proper" clause, its military responsibilities, and its revenue
responsibilities. Whether legislative actions in these areas speak cogently,
harmoniously, or clearly on emergency actions that government might take toward
the private sector or individuals becomes central to determining the lawfulness of
the executive's cyber functions.
Implementing Youngstown in the cyber arena becomes an exercise in parsing
legislative mandates related to information assurance, the use of military forces for
foreign and domestic functions, cyber communications, and perhaps numerous
other topics depending on the kind of cyber threat the executive faces. If the
executive seeks to engage the private sector to prepare for or respond to a cyber
emergency, including seizure of private property or control of industrial production
within the United States, the interplay of at least four statutes must be considered
from the information assurance perspective alone to discern congressional intent.
The first provides for a military-centric "Defense Information Assurance
Program" through the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000.54
This law acknowledges the critical relationship between military and private
systems by requiring the Secretary of Defense to coordinate with "representatives
of those national critical information infrastructure systems that are essential to the
operations of the Department and the armed forces on information assurance
measures necessary to the protection of these systems." 55 But it does not address
government seizure of private facilities or control of industrial production.
The second and third statutes both address information assurance functions
operating across government agencies. The Federal Information Security
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) established general information security risk
management requirements across a large number of agencies and government
information systems. It tasks agency heads to provide "information security
protections commensurate with the risk and magnitude of the harm resulting from
the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of'
agency information and information systems. 56 Agencies' information security
programs must take into account information systems of government contractors
that handle government information. But the law does not specify whether the
agencies can take any extraordinary action to protect government information on
those systems during emergency circumstances.57
53. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
54. Pub. L. No. 106-65, 113 Stat. 512 (1999) (codified in part in scattered titles and sections ofU.S.C.).
55. 10 U.S.C. § 2224(d) (2004).
56. 44 U.S.C. § 3544(a)(1)(A) (2002).
57. Id. § 3544(a)(1)(A)(ii).
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The third statute, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Homeland Security Act),
presents a disjointed approach to cyber functions, responsibilities, and coordination.
DHS's information security responsibilities for the federal government are most
clearly identified in the 2002 transfer of the General Services Administration's
Federal Computer Incident Response Center to DHS.58 That center was established
by FISMA to provide other agencies with a single federal resource for technical
assistance, analysis of information security threats, information about information
security threats, and consultations regarding information security and related
matters. 59 But the Homeland Security Act specifies no emergency power for this
operational cybersecurity entity to protect government information on government
contractors' networks.
Neither does the Homeland Security Act provide such authority in a provision
specifically defining the DHS role for "Enhancement of non-Federal
Cybersecurity."60 During various emergency and non-emergency periods, the
department may provide "technical assistance," "analysis and warnings," and
"crisis management support" to the private sector as well as state and local
governments. The law does not authorize federal officials to seize or control cyber
facilities or equipment or to control private production capabilities. Indeed, the
private sector must request DHS cyber assistance in any of those circumstances.61
To the extent that Congress has directly addressed the issue of government
seizure of facilities or production capabilities related to cyber emergencies, it may
be in a fourth statute-the Communications Act of 1934.62 Section 706 of that law,
titled "War powers of President," defines extraordinary actions the President can
take during various emergency periods even absent a declaration of war.63 In 1951
Congress amended the law to explicitly state a presidential prerogative to suspend
or amend certain Federal Communications Commission rules and regulations, close
certain regulated communications stations and devices, remove communications
equipment from those stations, or "authorize the use of control of any such station
or device and/or its apparatus and equipment, by any department of the Government
under such regulations as he may prescribe upon just compensation to the
owners." 64
Taken together, these four statutes might be interpreted to permit a range of
government action to protect private sector systems or seize or control them during
emergencies. However, there is significant legal and political peril for any President
in such a predicament since the DOD and DHS information assurance authority
falls short of allowing for such action when describing government's relationship
with the private sector. Such an outcome can lead the executive to consider other
plausible approaches by elements of the cyber administrative national security state
58. 6 U.S.C. § 121(g)(5) (2010).
59. 44 U.S.C. § 3546(a)(i)-(4) (2002).
60. 6 U.S.C. § 143 (2007).
61. Id. § 143(1), (2).
62. Pub. L. No. 73-416, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
(2012)).
63. 47 U.S.C. § 606 (1984).
64. Id. § 606(c).
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where legal authority is clearer, Congress can be engaged more efficiently, or
policy can be developed in smaller circles.
The complexity that pervades government cybersecurity law and policy
interests serves as background to explore Justice Jackson's further Youngstown
commentary on the interaction of executive and legislative duties.
We should not use this occasion to circumscribe, much less to contract,
the lawful role of the President as Commander-in-Chief. I should
indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his exclusive
function to command the instruments of national force, at least when
turned against the outside world for the security of our society. But,
when it is turned inward, not because of rebellion but because of a
lawful economic struggle between industry and labor, it should have no
such indulgence. His command power is not such an absolute as might
be implied from that office in a militaristic system but is subject to
limitations consistent with a constitutional Republic whose law and
policy-making breach is a representative Congress. The purpose of
lodging dual titles in one man was to insure that the civilian would
control the military, not to enable the military to subordinate the
presidential office. No penance would ever expiate the sin against free
government of holding that a President can escape control of executive
powers by law through assuming his military role. What the power of
command may include I do not try to envision, but I think it is not a
military prerogative, without support of law, to seize persons or property
because they are important or even essential for the military and naval
establishment.6 5
The two divisions that helped Justice Jackson conclude that the President
transgressed the Constitution are no longer so clear in cyberspace. Foreign cyber
threats necessitating "instruments of national force" can operate as much within
U.S. borders as throughout the "outside world." And "important or even essential"
linkages between domestic industries and the global "military and naval
establishment" have arguably developed into existential dependencies. This point is
clarified by thinking of the military's domestic and foreign interests in secure and
reliable supply chains, electricity, and other support services that operate through
cyber systems to sustain garrisoned or deployed forces.
It should be readily apparent that the domestic-foreign, public-private, and
military-civilian constitutional tensions presented in Youngstown make legislating
in the cybersecurity arena challenging well beyond the concerns of seizing
communications property, controlling domestic communications functions, and
sustaining the military. Energy and transportation infrastructure, financial services,
interstate and intrastate commerce, and federal and state government networks may
all be desirable cyber targets. The President's military powers are simply a starting
65. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645-46.
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point to consider steps that the cyber administrative national security state must take
to understand and address security issues of the digital age.
Thus, Youngstown's contribution to the emergency paradigm is twofold. First,
it provides that Congress's legislative role is particularly important where the
executive has no exclusive functions. Second, clarity is essential to giving effect to
legislative acts. In Justice Jackson's words, "We may say that the power to legislate
for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can
prevent power from slipping through its fingers."66 Where Congress is inactive or
ambiguous, the executive is particularly reliant on theories of executive power.
2. Cybersecurity and Legal Relativism
Theoretical frameworks to understand constitutional national security powers
can helpfully focus attention on points of specific legal, political, and social
concern. Professor Jules Lobel has noted the decline of liberalism and the
ascendency of relativism in government's approach to emergency circumstances
over the past century.67 He described the liberal view as attempting "to address the
tension between law and necessity by demarcating separate spheres of emergency
versus non-emergency governance." The Constitution provides a base of power
for an executive official to respond to an emergency, even to the point of violating
the law; however, the actions are unlawful unless a court, legislature, or the
populace as a whole determine otherwise. 69 In contrast, the relativist view holds
that "the Constitution is a flexible document that permits the President to take
whatever measures are necessary in crisis situations." 70 That is, the Constitution
provides both a source of power and legal authority for executive actions taken to
respond to emergencies.
Writing in 1989, Lobel observed that several factors accounted for the century-
long move toward relativism regarding emergency powers.
The routinization of crises, the rise of inherent executive power, the
delegation of vast emergency power, and the sway of legal realism in the
courts combined to break down the dichotomies upon which the liberal
constitutional tradition was premised. Although a grey area has always
accompanied the fixed dividing line between emergency and normalcy,
the hazy middle zone has expanded to include most important executive
exercises of foreign affairs power, resulting in broad, virtually unchecked
presidential power.71
66. Id. at 654.
67. Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1392 (1989).
68. Id. at 1389.
69. See id. at 1392-94 for a discussion of courts and legislatures responding to assertions of extra-legal
necessity by military and civilian federal officers.
70. Id. at 1388.
71. Id at 1412.
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These factors are as evident today as twenty-five years ago. And the legal realist
view that Lobel identified in Youngstown and many other court cases particularly
continues to hold sway: legal norms vary according to legislative prescriptions,
historical context, and other circumstances. 72
Lobel's concern for the emergence of a larger, "hazy middle zone" where
emergency powers are exercised routinely and contemporaneously with non-
emergency powers remains the central emergency-power concern of the digital age.
What has changed since 1989 is the emergence of cyberspace and, notably, the
concern that any motivated, resourced global actor can cause a kinetic attack, stock
exchange take-down, local infrastructure emergency, or other significant harm in
nanoseconds.73 State governments, the military, civilian federal agencies, and all
levels of law enforcement share common concerns in this reality even before
considering their unique or overlapping government functions. To further define
today's emergency paradigm, the middle zone of Lobel's conceptual emergency
paradigm must allow room to embrace these actors, functions, and interests. This
presents the opportunity to reconsider the assignment of cyber roles across the
cyber administrative national security state, mechanisms to regulate those roles, and
methods and measures of accountability.
Notwithstanding the historical trend toward the relativist view of executive
emergency powers, traces of liberal constitutionalism in developing cyber
intelligence programs are evident in Republican and Democratic administrations
alike since 9/11. Executive branch efforts to brief Congress's intelligence
committees, make certain information available to all Members of Congress for
review, and obtain legislative reauthorization for cyber intelligence programs
ultimately seek to resolve legal, social, and political tensions in the exercise of
terrorism-related emergency powers. 74 And as the Obama Administration has
asserted: the FISA Court has performed its statutory role reviewing government
legal arguments and authorizing emergency data collections; the government has
corrected errors implementing the court's orders; and those conducting the cyber
intelligence programs are governed by an array of administrative requirements that
balance the constitutional issues involved.75 Many congressional voices, including
the chairmen of the House and Senate intelligence committees, have echoed this
view.76 The assertion is that the cyber administrative national security state is thus
72. Id.at1409-ll.
73. William J. Lynn, III, Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Sept.-Oct. 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain.
74. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT, 17-19 (2013), available at
www2.gwu.edul-nsarchiv/NSAEBBfNSAEBB436/docs/EBB-ll 5.pdf.
75. See Id.
76. See, e.g., Meet the Press: Intel Leaders Back President's Privacy Plan (NBC News television
broadcast Jan. 19, 2014) (transcript on file with the author), available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/54117257/ns/meet-the-press-transcripts/t/january-diane-feinstein-mike-rogres-
alexis-ohanian-john-wisniewski-rudy-giuliani-robert-gates-newt-gingrich-andrea-mithcell-harold-ford-
#.U2vFhSgsOTA) (Mike Rogers, Chairman, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, applauding
and agreeing with President Obama "standing up and saying 'Hey, the [NSA] program did not have abuses.
This wasn't sinister. It wasn't a rogue agency. It was legal and proper."'); Dianne Feinstein, The NSA's
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complying with the requirements of the emergency paradigm and thereby
appropriately addressing the emergency circumstances.
These examples demonstrate only a modest nod to liberal constitutionalism as
it operated into the twentieth century. Abraham Lincoln's May 1861 public order
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus demonstrates that public
awareness of both the constitutional emergency and the broader emergency
circumstances is an important element of liberal constitutionalisn. The
constitutional emergency arose from the perceived ambiguity in Article I about the
need for legislative action to suspend the privilege. That emergency was
exacerbated when a federal court in Maryland rejected both Lincoln's order and the
power of a military officer acting under it.77 The constitutional emergency was
assuaged over time through various political processes that engaged the public and
Congress to find equilibrium among legal, political, and social norms for
government functions, regulatory mechanisms, and accountability measures during
the wartime emergency. With the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 Congress ultimately
brought a degree of resolution to the constitutional emergency by delineating broad
presidential emergency authority on the issue: ". . . during the present rebellion, the
President of the United States, whenever, in his judgment, the public safety may
require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any
case throughout the United States, or any part thereof."78
In contrast to the way that the public experienced Civil War threats and related
emergency powers, today's public remains at a great distance from perceiving the
threats and related emergency powers of terrorism and cyber actors. Indeed, the
secrecy that places government counterterrorism efforts and cyber intelligence
programs beyond the public's personal experience places a unique burden on a
representative government to strike appropriate balances on the public's behalf.
And there is concern among scholars like Professor Andrew Bacevich that the
public increasingly displays a growing fascination for militarism and technological
solutions that propels government to apply military force to achieve national
objectives rather than applying political pressure to curb emergencies and seek
other means to achieve national security goals.79 All of this challenges the argument
that minimal public debate and limited executive branch engagement with small
groups of legislators on cyber intelligence programs and related cybersecurity
objectives can achieve suitable democratic outcomes.
Although the cyber administrative national security state may take significant
steps to comply with and clarify the dictates of the emergency paradigm,
constitutional emergencies related to cyber intelligence programs or other
government cyber functions may lurk in any number of legislative or executive
Watchfulness Protects America, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2013,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304520704579125950862794052 ("The NSA call-
records program is working and contributing to our safety. It is legal and it is subject to strict oversight and
thorough judicial review").
77. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861).
78. The Habeas Corpus Act, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
79. ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN MILITARISM: How AMERICANS ARE SEDUCED BY WAR
9-33 (2005).
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functions. Constitutional claims in active litigation against the executive assert
First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment concerns.80  And upon close, public
examination of the statutory and procedural recesses of the emergency paradigm,
additional constitutional concerns may also appear. For example, legal arguments
and interpretations of the Constitution, FISA, and other applicable law advanced for
counterterrorism or other emergency needs may skew the cyber administrative
national security state toward narrow understandings of the law and a narrow range
of policy and legislative options to address any range of present, future, emergency,
or non-emergency cyber issues.
To be clear, the revelation of any constitutional emergency through court cases
or other opportunities for public scrutiny need not be viewed presumptively as
willful executive transgression of clearly established norms. Congress, itself, may
be the deficient constitutional actor in failing to legislate for or oversee executive
functions attendant to the emergency circumstances. One dimension of this concern
relates to the executive inefficiency and policy development challenges that extend
from legislative ambiguity, burdensome or ineffective committee structures, or
parochial procedural rules. As important to consider, however, is Congress's ability
to order and operate itself to match the challenges of emergent cyber concerns.
These concerns encourage an examination of the structures and processes by which
the legislative and executive elements of the cyber administrative national security
state operate on the continuum from non-emergency through emergency national
needs.
B. Framework Legislation
The emergency paradigm is defined and shaped as much by legislation and
practice as by legal theory and courts. Framework legislation often establishes the
organizational structure and processes for government entities to operate as much as
it provides general authority for agency operations. In this way it carries
constitutional and other legal and social norms into day-to-day government
activities. The Judiciary Act of 1789, for example, ordered the judicial system.81
And a spate of 2 0 th century framework legislation has addressed everything from
civil rights82 and administrative procedure83 to emergency powers, 84 disaster
response, and foreign intelligence. As the digital age continues to see rapid
80. See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 2013 WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013) (alleging First, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendment violations); A.C.L.U. v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (alleging First and
Fourth Amendment violations); Jewel v. N.S.A., 673 F. 3d 902 (9th Cir. 2011) (alleging First and Fourth
Amendment violations).
81. The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
82. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 258 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-4 (2012)).
83. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
84. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255-58 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1651 (2006)).
85. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88
Stat. 143 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2012).
2013-14] 267
Journal ofLegislation
expansion, diversification, and personalized use of interconnected networks and
devices,87 framework legislation for cyberspace issues could provide a means to
address increasingly complex questions of cyber policy and law in longstanding,
new, large, small, technical, operational, and other parts of the cyber administrative
national security state alike.
1. The "National Security Constitution" and the "Emergency Constitution"
With respect to foreign affairs functions, Professor Harold Koh has introduced
the concept of the "national security constitution" to demonstrate how framework
legislation, court decisions, and other sources of legal principles collectively
operate in practice to shape constitutional norms. The term embraces the many
interrelated duties that can be discerned between the executive and legislative
branches in a given foreign affairs emergency. This framing helpfully demonstrates
how constitutional text, legislative intent, judicial perspectives, legal theory, and
policy interests come together to shape government action. The concept is equally
applicable to the broader range of cyber national security concerns of the
emergency paradigm.
Professor Bruce Ackerman has proposed another concept related to
constitutional norms and framework legislation that enables thoughtful analysis of
cybersecurity issues. Writing after 9/11 he advocated new framework legislation
continuing the aims of the National Emergencies Act of 1976 to improve
government's functioning during terrorist-related emergencies.8 9 Concerns about
unwarranted detention and lack of access to civilian courts contributed to his
proposal to reconstitute an "emergency constitution" through framework legislation
that would improve the balance between security needs and individual liberties. He
recommended supermajority voting requirements to continue any presidentially
declared emergency,90 broader access to executive branch information for majority
and minority parties in Congress,9 1 financial compensation to victims of preventive
detention,92 and new norms for judges to apply during emergency periods. 93The
hope was to avoid historical failures like the Japanese-American internment camps
of World War II.94 Lest these concerns about using military forces domestically to
respond to national security threats be considered an anachronism, cyber- and
86. FISA, supra note 12.
87. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND How TO STOP IT (2008); Jack
Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006);
Julie Cohen, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE
(2012).
88. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the
Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255, 1282-84 (1988).
89. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L. J. 1029, 1031-32 (2004).
90. Id. at 1047-49.
91. Id. at 1050-53.
92. Id. at 1062-66.
93. Id. at 1066-74 (proposing that judges' overriding concern be decency with respect to torture,
detention, and other emergency concerns).
94. See id. at 1041-45.
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terrorism-related debates should be informed by the knowledge that in 2002 the
Bush Administration considered using military forces to detain five terrorism
suspects near Buffalo, New York.95
Ackerman's emergency constitution continues a tradition of scholarly focus on
legislative solutions to the challenges of executive excess, preservation of civil
liberties, increased transparency, and effective oversight. 96 It proposes that a return
to liberal constitutionalism is both possible and valuable, at least to improve the
nation's approaches to terrorist-related emergencies. Considering the new threat
landscape that military and intelligence communities face carrying out
counterterrorism operations like the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, Professor
Robert Chesney has also recommended updates to framework legislation to
improve information sharing with Congress, promote executive branch
accountability for military and intelligence operations, and provide clear legal
authority for the conduct of military cyber actions according to international and
federal law.97 While scholarly calls for legislative solutions are by no means
exclusive,98 the common theme is that the legislative process returns benefits that
cannot otherwise be achieved.
2. Framework Legislation for the Emergency Paradigm
Military and Intelligence Reform
Many framework statutes establish structures and processes for the cyber
administrative national security state. Defense, foreign affairs, and intelligence
functions were first treated comprehensively in the National Security Act of 1947
(National Security Act),99 which continues to serve as a cornerstone of the
emergency paradigm. The National Security Act recast the post-war military and
intelligence enterprise to improve executive branch organizational structures and
policy coordination mechanisms in three significant ways. 00 The first was the
establishment of a National Security Council (NSC)
to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic,
foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to
enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of
the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the
95. Mark Mazzetti & David Johnston, Bush Weighed Using Military in Arrests, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 25,
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/25/us/25detain.html?_r=0.
96. See, e.g., Gerhard Caspar, The Constitutional Organization of the Government, 26 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 177 (1985).
97. Robert Chesney, Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate, 5 J.
NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 539, 543-44 (2012).
98. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security Presiprudence, 26 QuINIPIAC L. REV.
439 (2008).
99. National Security Act, supra note 14.




Second, the National Security Act created a cabinet-level secretaryl02 and a Joint
Chiefs of Staff 03 to provide unified management of the military services as a single
entity-the "national military establishment."1 04 The Secretary of Defense was
charged to serve as a member of the NSC and as the "principal assistant to the
President in all matters relating to the national security." 05 Finally, the National
Security Act established the CIA as a function of the NSC. o0 Congress amended
the National Security Act two years later to create the DOD out of the national
military establishment. 107
Since the CIA's creation, structures and processes regulating the U.S.
intelligence community have evolved as much by internal executive branch
prerogative as by legislative action. Notably, Executive Order 12,333 continues to
provide important guidelines for the collection of intelligence and the conduct of
intelligence activities, including cyber intelligence programs. 08 In creating judicial
and executive branch processes to regulate the collection and use of
communications for foreign intelligence purposes, the FISA of 1978 serves as a
cornerstone of cyber-related framework legislation. Through Snowden's disclosures
FISA is known to be the basis for significant government contacts with U.S.
industry and the capability for various intelligence agencies to collect large volumes
of communications data from cyberspace for counterterrorism purposes. But the
framework legislation with the largest impact on the future of government's posture
to address strategic cybersecurity issues from an intelligence perspective is the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA).1 09
IRTPA's most significant contribution to the emergency paradigm is the
establishment of a Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to provide a point of
coordination and leadership outside any one intelligence agency. lo This fulfilled a
longstanding objective of intelligence reform" ll and enables the strategic growth
and coordination of intelligence functionalities. By amendment to the National
Security Act, the DNI "act[s] as the principal adviser to the President, to the
National Security Council, and the Homeland Security Council for intelligence
matters related to the national security."I12 IRTPA's other significant contribution
101. Id. § 101(a); 50 U.S.C. § 3021(a) (2012).
102. National Security Act, supra note 14, § 202.
103. Id. § 211.
104. Id. §201.
105. Id. §§ 101(a), 202(a).
106. Id. § 102(d).
107. National Security Act Amendments of 1949, ch. 412, sec. 4, § 201, 63 Stat. 578-79.
108. Supra note 13.
109. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
110. 50 U.S.C. §§ 3023(b)(1), (c) (2004).
111. COMM'N ON THE ROLES AND CAPABILITIES OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMTY., PREPARING FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY: AN APPRAISAL OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE app. A-13 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 U.S.
Intelligence Community Report].
112. 50 U.S.C. § 3023(b)(2) (West 2004).
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is the creation of new organizations and functions to deliver a strategic, nationwide,
public-private, intelligence capability.
The most significant element of this capability is the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), which develops operational counterterrorism plans to integrate "all
instruments of national power, including diplomatic, financial, military,
intelligence, homeland security, and law enforcement activities within and among
agencies" 113 on behalf of the DNI. Extending from these planning responsibilities,
the NCTC also assigns cyber and other counterterrorism roles and responsibilities
to other government agencies. 114 IRTPA supplements this federal level of
intelligence activity with a nationwide, intergovernmental, public-private
information sharing framework and network. Under the DNI's direction, federal,
state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector collaborate to create an
"Information Sharing Environment"" 5 through which they develop common means
to share terrorism information.1 6 And reflecting the coordinated approach to
intelligence that the DNI was envisioned to provide, the DNI has commissioned the
FBI to lead regional intelligence centers that connect government and private
entities.17 In short, iterative changes to the FISA and the new structural regime
provided by the IRTPA have reshaped the emergency paradigm to create an
expansive national intelligence enterprise to address concerns related to cyber
terrorism. The methods that intelligence agencies employ, the relationships they
establish with the private sector and other governments, and the information they
can assess enable them to perform or help perform many federal and sub-federal
government cybersecurity functions beyond the concerns of cyber terrorism.
Commercial, International, and Economic Emergencies
Another cornerstone of the emergency paradigm is the National Emergencies
Act of 1976, which provides a framework for the executive to declare and exercise
emergency powers described in law by Congress.118 The law ensures a degree of
public awareness, congressional engagement, and government transparency and
accountability by requiring the President to: declare an emergency publicly, identify
the specific provisions of law describing the emergency powers being exercised,
transmit the declaration to Congress, publish the declaration in the Federal Register,
and report to Congress on emergency expenditures.119 Congress clearly envisioned
the law as a mechanism to avoid persistent states of emergency. With few
113. 50 U.S.C.A § 3056(d)(2) (West 2004).
114. Id.§ 3056(d)(3).
115. 6 U.S.C.A. § 485(a)(3), (b) (2010); OFFIce of the DIR. of NAT'L Intelligence, Information Sharing
Environment, available at,http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organizationlinformation-sharing-
environment-who-we-are.
116. 6 U.S.C.A. § 485(a)(5).
117. Greg Miller, FBI gets a broader role in coordinating domestic intelligence activities, WASH POST,
June 19, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/fbi-gets-a-broader-role-in-
coordinating-domestic-intelligence-activities/2012/06/19/gJQAtmupoVstory.html.
118. Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§1601 etseq. (2000)).
119. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1521(a), 1641(c).
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exceptions, upon enactment it terminated all states of emergency within two
years.120 And it required the Senate and House to meet within six months of newly
declared emergencies "to consider a vote on a joint resolution to determine whether
that emergency shall be terminated."l 2 ' However, according to one recent study,
Congress has never taken action under this provision,122 and thirty ongoing states of
emergency were in effect as of 2013.123
The International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977124 reflects an
attempt to establish procedures by which the executive and legislative branches
interoperate when the President wishes to take emergency actions related to foreign
exchange transactions, foreign property interests, foreign credit transfers or
payments, or importing or exporting of currency or securities.125 It builds upon the
National Emergencies Act and requires supplemental executive consultation with
and reporting to Congress.126 The law acknowledges the President's constitutional
power to take measures "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which
has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States." Many cybersecurity
concerns conceivably fall within this broad language; however, Congress has
further provided that the President's authority does not extend to
(1) any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal
communications, which does not involve a transfer of anything of
value; . .. or
(3) the importation from any country, or the exportation to any
country, whether commercial or otherwise, regardless of format or
medium of transmission, of any information or information materials,
including but not limited to, publications, films, posters, phonograph
records, photographs, microfilms, microfiche, tapes, compact disks, CD
ROMs, artworks, and new wire feeds.127
From one perspective, the law allows flexibility for Congress and
the President to consider whether and how cyberspace concerns should
be understood and addressed as emergencies. From another perspective,
the law's ambiguity handicaps both branches in planning for the
particular circumstances of the digital age.
120. Id. §§ 1601(a), 1651.
121. Id. § 1622(b).
122. Patrick A. Thronson, Toward Comprehensive Reform of America's Emergency Law Regime, 46
MICH. L. REv. 737, 752 (2013).
123. Id. at 754.
124. Pub. L. No. 95-223, §§ 201-208, 91 Stat. 1625, 1626-29 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (2001)).
125. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a)(1) (2001).
126. See id. § 1703.
127. See id. § 1702(b).
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Federal Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Critical Infrastructure Protection
Framework legislation in 1970,128 1974,129 and 1988130 developed today's
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to integrate federal, state, and
local government efforts for emergency preparedness, response, recovery, and
disaster assistance. The present Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act enables federal planning, training, exercises, research and other
capabilities for cyber emergencies primarily through its emergency preparedness
provisions.131 This covers
all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to prepare for
or minimize the effects of a hazard upon the civilian population, to deal
with the immediate emergency conditions which would be created by
the hazard, and to effectuate emergency repairs to, or the emergency
restoration of, vital utilities and facilities destroyed or damaged by the
hazard.132
Cyber emergencies are included here because the term "hazard" is defined to
include any "man-caused event."1 33
FEMA may have broader cyber capabilities and responsibilities by virtue of its
specific disaster assistance and emergency response functions related to "major
disasters." This term is defined to mean any natural catastrophe or
regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the
United States, which in the determination of the President causes
damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster
assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and available
resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations
in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. 1 34
Cyber threats from foreign nations, terrorist groups, or individuals may cause fires,
floods or explosions through computers regulating water levels of dams, electricity-
distribution systems, or other elements of publicly or privately owned, operated,
maintained, regulated, or administered critical infrastructure.
Congress has linked this long-standing FEMA focus on disasters, preparedness,
and emergency response to national cyber objectives and broader critical
infrastructure protection interests only lightly. The Critical Infrastructures
128. Disaster ReliefAct of 1970, 84 Stat. 1744, 15 U.S.C. § 636a (repealed by Pub. L. 97-35).
129. Disaster ReliefAct Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143.
130. Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121 (1988).
131. See id. § 5131.
132. Id. § 5195a(a)(3).
133. See id. § 5195a(a)(1)(b).
134. Id. § 5122(2).
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Protection Act of 2001135 asserted a congressional finding that a "continuous
national effort is required to ensure the reliable provision of cyber and physical
infrastructure services critical to maintaining the national defense, continuity of
government, economic prosperity, and quality of life in the United States."l 36
Congress further provided that:
It is the policy of the United States
(1) that any physical or virtual disruption of the operation of the critical
infrastructures of the United States be rare, brief, geographically limited
in effect, manageable, and minimally detrimental to the economy,
human and government services, and national security of the United
States;
(2) that actions necessary to achieve the policy stated in paragraph (1)
be carried out in a public-private partnership involving corporate and
non-governmental organizations; and
(3) to have in place a comprehensive and effective program to ensure
the continuity of essential Federal Government functions under all
circumstances. 137
No agency roles are assigned to carry out these objectives. But a National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center created by the law "to serve as a
source of national competence to address critical infrastructure protection and
continuity through support for activities related to counterterrorism, threat
assessment, and risk mitigation"l138 now operates through the DHS Office of
Infrastructure Protection. This office collaborates with FEMA and the private
sector pursuant to 2007 amendments to the Homeland Security Act to jointly
develop guidance, recommendations, best practices, and voluntary preparedness
standards to address private sector interests. 140
The most recent, collective legislative treatment of cyber, infrastructure, and
emergency management issues is the 2007 reconstitution of FEMA with a primary
mission to "reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all
hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters
135. Pub. L. 107-56, § 1016, 115 Stat. 400 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5195c (2001)).
136. Id. § 5195c(b)(3).
137. Id. § 5195c(c).
138. Id. § 5195c(d)(1).
139. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, § 611(13) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 321);
see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, "ABOUT THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION
AND ANALYSIS CENTER," available at http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-infrastructure-simulation-and-
analysis-center.
140. Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-53,
Title IX, § 901(a), Aug. 3, 2007, 121 Stat. 364 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 3211).
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by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency
management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and
mitigation."141 More specifically, amendments to the Homeland Security Act
charge the FEMA Administrator to
coordinate the implementation of a risk-based, all-hazards strategy for
preparedness that builds those common capabilities necessary to
respond to natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made
disasters while also building the unique capabilities necessary to
respond to specific types of incidents that pose the greatest risk to our
Nation. 142
While it is clear that FEMA's preparedness and response capabilities must be
available for an emergency with a cyber dimension, it remains unclear whether
Congress's iterative approach to these issues is meant to go further. The language
could be understood to mean that FEMA should develop cyber capabilities to
actively mitigate cyber threats posed by terrorists or other threat actors so public-
private risk-management programs are conducted fluidly by a single government
entity from a period of normalcy through an emergency and back to normalcy. Yet
these laws were contemporaneous with both the reauthorization of government's
cyber intelligence programs and the further development of other DHS offices to
achieve specific information security, cybersecurity and critical infrastructure
objectives.
Congressional Reform
Congress has taken comparatively less opportunity to reconfigure its
committees and redefine its chamber rules to match executive branch reforms. But
congressional reform preceded legislation to reorder the executive branch during
the military and intelligence reform periods of the 1940s and 1970s. The Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1946 created armed services committees in each chamber to
oversee and legislate for the military establishment created by the National Security
Act.143 And in 1976 and 1977, respectively, the Senate and House established the
current select committees on intelligence.144
Reporting of intelligence activities to Congress changed markedly beginning in
the 1970s. Covert CIA operations were first required to be reported to Congress in
1974 through an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act.145 Four years later,
141. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, § 611(11), Pub. L. 109-295, 120 Stat.
1355 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(1)).
142. Id. § 314(b).
143. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, §§ 102, 121, 60 Stat. 812, 815, 822, 824.
144. 1996 U.S. Intelligence Community Report, supra note 111, at A-18.
145. Pub. L. No. 93-559, § 662(a), 88 Stat. 1804, repealed by Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1991, § 601. Upon repeal of the 1974 reporting requirement, Congress created a new, broader
framework for oversight of intelligence activities in the National Security Act, which is codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. § 3091 etseq..
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FISA established semi-annual reporting requirements "concerning all electronic
surveillance" within the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.146 It also
required reports of administrative procedures established by the Attorney General to
minimize the acquisition, retention, and sharing of non-public information.147
Congress has further updated executive branch reporting requirements sporadically
since 1980.148 But the structures and processes of the intelligence committees
themselves, particularly following 9/11, have changed little and are viewed by
government and outside groups as dysfunctional and counterproductive. 149 And a
longstanding proposal for Congress to operate a joint intelligence committee
modeled on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy has never succeeded. so Neither
have the proposals of the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States regarding comprehensive legislative reform to enable efficient
intelligence and homeland security legislation and oversight. 5 1
The hallmarks of government's recent changes to the emergency paradigm are
the legislative reforms that created the new concept of homeland security and then
reconstituted government to focus more specifically on long-standing
counterterrorism interests. The two fields operate according to contradictory norms.
Homeland security activities are characterized by open engagement across
government and non-government communities to achieve broad national objectives,
including counterterrorism. In contrast, policies and functions developed through
intelligence entities focused on counterterrorism are characterized by secrecy and
limited-access forums. While the Homeland Security Act was Congress's first
attempt to provide the paradigm to integrate counterterrorism objectives with
broader national strategies, the IRTPA and other laws subsequently provided
separate government structures and processes. And there remains as much
uncertainty in the legal frameworks that regulate agencies within each field as at the
points where the two fields attempt to work together effectively.
3. Cybersecurity Law and Organization
Framework legislation does not exist for cybersecurity. Congress's trend since
the 1980s has been to address digital age issues separately. The Computer Security
146. FISA, supra note 12, §§ 102(a), 106.
147. Id. §§ 107, 108.
148. See 1996 U.S. Intelligence Community Report, supra note 111, at A-19-25 (noting the Intelligence
Oversight Act of 1980, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, legislation
in 1989 to establish an Inspector General for the CIA, and the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1993).
149. L. ELAINE HALCHIN & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32525, CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE: CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ALTERNATIVES, Report 1-9 (2012), available at
www.fas.orglsgp/crs/intel/RL32525.pdf (noting reports of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction, Bipartisan Policy Center, and Council
on Foreign Relations).
150. Id.
151. THE 9/11 COMMIssioN REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, 419-21.
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Act of 1987,152 the Communications Decency Act of 1996,' the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,154 and the E-Government Act of 200215 speak
to this norm. So does the trend to incrementally update the criminal code to address
technological advances and privacy, for example, through the Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986,156 the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986,157 and
the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 1994.158
In the area of information security, FISMA comes closest to serving as
framework legislation because it establishes a widely applicable compliance
program and assigns responsibilities to specific officials within agencies and at the
White House. While agency heads are responsible for implementing information
security programs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget bears
overall responsibility for those programs and reporting to Congress. DOD and CIA
information systems are excepted from the Director's responsibility.159
The Homeland Security Act places DHS's information security functions in a
broader framework. DHS operates the government incident handling center for
information security established by FISMA and subsequently transferred to
DHS.160 Similar expertise is available to enhance cybersecurity for the private
sector and state, local, and tribal governments. And the Homeland Security Act
transferred a range of cyber, communications, and related infrastructure functions
from the FBI, DOD, Department of Commerce, and Department of Energy.161 Each
of these entities-the National Infrastructure Protection Center, National
Communications System, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, and National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center respectively-had relationships with
the private sector.
Many functions closely related to information security remain distributed
across government. The National Telecommunications and Information
Administration within the Department of Commerce manages Internet governance
issues.162 The Commerce Department's National Institute of Standards and
Technology establishes technical standards for civilian government information
systems.163 The NSA establishes technical standards for government information
systems handling classified national security information.164 And independent
regulatory agency roles include: the Federal Communications Commission's role
regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire,
152. Pub. L.No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724.
153. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
154. Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860.
155. Pub. L.No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899.
156. Pub. L. No. 98-473,98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
157. Pub. L.No.99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2002)).
158. Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994)).
159. FISMA, 44 U.S.C. § 3543(c) (2002).
160. Id. § 3546.
161. Homeland Security Act of2002, 6 U.S.C. § 121(g)(l)-( 4 ) (2010).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1512; 47 U.S.C. § 902(b)(2)(H); 47 U.S.C. § 901(c)(3); Exec. Order No. 12,046, 43 Fed.
Reg. 13,349 (Mar. 29, 1978) (revoked in part).
163. 40 U.S.C. § 11331 (2006); 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3 (2006).
164. NSD-42, supra note 22.
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satellite and cable;165 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's role enforcing
cybersecurity reliability standards across the bulk power system; 16 the Federal
Trade Commission's role enforcing "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" related to
cyber privacy policies and other cybersecurity concerns; and the Securities and
Exchange Commission's guidance that companies disclose cybersecurity risks and
incidents to comply with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Congress provides funding, oversight, and legislation in these areas
through committees with primary jurisdiction for respective agencies, not through a
single committee or comprehensive cyber coordination process.
Agencies have increasingly sought close coordination and even fusion of these
cyber functions distributed across the executive branch. By agreement with the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Department of Homeland
Security now performs a number of FISMA functions that complement DHS's
cyber incident handling, analysis and warning, and technical assistance functions
described both in FISMA and the Homeland Security Act.19 The FBI, DHS, and
NSA all operate cyber centers to integrate other government cyber interests and
knowledge with their core investigative/intelligence, infrastructure protection, and
military/intelligence cyber programs respectively.170 Most significantly,
government's signals intelligence, military information assurance, and cyber
warfighting capabilities are fused by having the same individual lead the NSA and
U.S. Cyber Command.
This dual command structure for the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command speaks to
the long-standing, robust capability that exists across certain elements of the cyber
administrative national security state to address cyber intelligence and defense
matters. As currently constructed, U.S. Cyber Command reflects numerous
evolutionary steps that the defense community has taken since the mid-1980s with
armed services committees, defense appropriations committees, intelligence
committees, and other elements of Congress to understand and address military and
related cyber threats. The NSA has gone through similar strategic changes. In 1999
an agency review team concluded that the "NSA is an organization ripe for
divestiture: its individual capabilities are of greater value than is the organization as
a whole." The agency envisioned a future in which it "operates and thrives in the
165. 47 U.S.C. § 151 etseq. (2006).
166. Energy Policy Act of 2005, § 1211 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824o (2006)).
167. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
168. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N., CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: Topic No. 2-CYBERSECURITY (2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
169. See, e.g., MEMORANDUM M-10-28 FROM THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES (2010),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda-2010/mi0-28.pdf;
170. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, NATIONAL CYBER INVESTIGATIVE JOINT TASK FORCE,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/ncijtf (last visited Apr. 21, 2014); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY AND COMMUNICATIONS INTEGRATION CENTER,
http://www.dhs.gov/about-national-cybersecurity-communications-integration-center (last visited Apr. 21,
2014); WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY POLICY CAPTURE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cyber/CybersecurityCentersGraphic.pdf (last visited Apr. 21,
2014).
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net" of the digital age as part of a plan to demonstrate value to the government
beyond the sum of its various parts.' Whether as a direct result of subsequent
planning or a combination of other factors, Snowden's disclosures reveal an
element of fulfillment of long-standing, strategic NSA objectives, ostensibly
understood and supported by the NSA's legislative counterparts in the cyber
administrative national security state. The historic core of the emergency paradigm
has evolved through such close relationships, while the newer elements develop at
some remove from those activities through a non-military, non-intelligence, non-
law enforcement set of relationships in the cyber administrative national security
state.
IV. Conclusion
Cybersecurity has emerged as the next great test of the emergency paradigm.
To date, legislation to prepare the nation for cyber emergencies has largely focused
on developing military and intelligence organizations and capabilities. Assuming
that some range of threats will continue to clearly warrant such treatment,
Congress's focus on military and intelligence organizations and issues is not
surprising. But that focus limits Congress's view of broader cyberspace issues.
Unlike previous initiatives to organize itself and then the executive branch to
meet twentieth-century security challenges, Congress has been unable to address
cross-cutting cyber concerns. Whereas the military threats of the Cold War
necessitated an analogous response to deter or respond to attacks, the nature of
cyberspace is different. Cybersecurity concerns can conceivably be precluded,
mitigated, or otherwise addressed by private, sub-federal government, and civilian
federal government entities. The arguments for military, intelligence, and law
enforcement actors operating in relative secrecy under special legal authority are
therefore to be constructed, not presumed.
In short, the cyber administrative national security state must be capable of
correcting course and forming itself to embrace public, economic, trade, civil
liberties, regulatory, international, and other concerns. This expansive range of
issues should encourage Congress to dedicate significant effort to drafting
framework legislation that extends beyond foreign intelligence issues. The need for
such comprehensive treatment predates Snowden's disclosures; his actions have
simply clarified and publicized certain ways in which constitutional questions arise
in the digital age.
171. Nat'l Sec. Agency, NEW ENTERPRISE TEAM RECOMMENDATIONS: THE DIRECTOR'S WORK PLAN
FOR CHANGE (1999), available at
http://www.nsa.gov/publicinfo/_files/directors_misc/DirectorsWork_Plan.pdf.
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